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 ABSTRACT 
Estimating Markups under Nonlinear Pricing Competition* 
by Eugenio J. Miravete and Lars-Hendrik Röller 
This paper provides a structural interpretation to the estimates of the shape and 
position of nonlinear tariffs. We focus on the evaluation of price-cost margins, 
and thus we need to identify marginal cost from an equilibrium model of 
nonlinear pricing competition. We estimate these price-cost margins using 
quarterly data from the early U.S. cellular telephone industry between 1984 and 
1988. Our results indicate that the margins are increased under duopoly, due to 
a significant reduction in marginal costs. Moreover, we find that the price-cost 
margins vary over the consumption levels and that low end users are subject to 
higher price-cost margins than high-end users. The impact of competition 
further increases the margins in the low-end user segment, relative to high end-
users. In that sense the benefits of competition, which are largely due to 
increased efficiencies, are passed on relatively more to high-end users. We also 
show that these findings are robust even if one includes a number of observable 
market demand and cost variables. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Schätzung von Preisaufschlägen im nicht-linearen Preissetzungswett-
bewerb 
Dieses Papier bietet eine strukturelle Interpretation der Schätzungen der Form 
und Position nichtlinearer Tarife. Dabei konzentrieren wir uns auf die Bewertung 
von Preisaufschlägen und müssen daher zunächst die Grenzkosten in einem 
Gleichgewichtsmodell nicht-linearen Preiswettbewerbs identifizieren. Wir 
schätzen diese Preisaufschläge, indem wir Quartalsdaten der jungen 
Mobilfunkindustrie der U.S.A. zwischen 1984 und 1988 verwenden. Die 
Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Aufschläge in einem Duopol aufgrund 
signifikanter Grenzkostenreduktion größer sind. Außerdem lässt sich feststellen, 
dass die Preisaufschläge über die Konsumniveaus variieren und dass Nutzer im 
Niedrigsegment (‚low-end’) höhere Preisaufschläge zu tragen haben als ‚high-
end’-Nutzer. Der Einfluß des Wettbewerbs vergrößert noch die Preisaufschläge 
im ‚low-end’-Bereich im Vergleich zum ‚high-end’. In diesem Sinne profitieren 
die ‚high-end’-Nutzer mehr vom Wettbewerb, der sich vor allem in gesteigerten 
Effizienzen positiv niederschlägt. Diese Ergebnisse sind robust, wie gezeigt 
werden kann, sogar wenn eine Reihe beobachtbarer Marktnachfrage- und  
Kostenvariablen hinzugefügt wird. 
 
iv 
1 Introduction
Nonlinear pricing is a phenomenon that is observed in many markets, such as electricity, gas, and
telecommunications. In recent years, many of these markets have undergone a tremendous amount of
regulatory and structural changes, raising many issues as to the impact of competition and regulation
in markets where firms compete in nonlinear prices. Given its empirical relevance, it is somewhat
surprising that are few structural empirical papers that investigate the impact of nonlinear pricing
strategies on consumers, firms, and welfare.
This paper describes a structural model of competition, where firms compete in nonlinear
prices. In general, nonlinear pricing introduces new issues that are absent in models of uniform
pricing. When a firm offers a menu of two-part tariffs, consumers self-select the tariff that is optimal
for them. Designing the menu of tariffs according to the distribution of consumers introduces the
possibility for a firm to price-discriminate amongst consumer groups. As a result the price–cost
margins vary across consumer groups.
In such a setting, competition affects the equilibrium tariff functions in a number of ways.
Intuitively, firms not only have to design the tariff function subject to consumers self-selecting a
tariff, but also take the tariff function offered by other firms into account. In other words, enforcing
consumers’ incentive compatibility constraint becomes more complicated since now consumers have
the outside option of purchasing from the competitor and not only the possibility of not participating
in the market.
In equilibrium, competition affects price cost–margins in a number of ways. If marginal
costs and the distribution of consumer types are held constant, price cost margins –as well as
profits– decline, while all consumers benefits should increase. However, the impact of competition
on price–cost margins varies across consumer groups, which implies that some segments become
less profitable than others. As a result, competition can affects consumer groups rather differently.
For instance, under nonlinear pricing it is entirely possible that some consumers benefit much more
– 1 –
than others. Moreover, when competition is associated with a decline in marginal costs (due to
possible efficiency gains) or when the distribution of consumer types changes, then it is possible that
price–cost margins increase for some consumer types under competition.
To evaluate such price–cost margins, we need to recover marginal costs. In this sense the
approach taken in this paper is in line with other models of empirical industrial organization. We
identify marginal costs from an equilibrium model of competition. In this paper we concentrate
on identifying marginal costs and investigate price–cost margins. As we will see, there are other
structural parameters of importance. These include the distribution of consumer types, as well as
the “marginal consumer” (i.e., the consumer that is indifferent between subscribing to a tariff plan
or not subscribing at all). In particular, the distribution of consumer types is necessary in order
to evaluate consumer surplus or welfare, as one need to integrate over consumer types to arrive at
aggregate rents. However, the identification assumptions needed to recover the consumer distribution
are substantially more demanding than the ones needed for the identification of marginal costs [see
Miravete and Ro¨ller, (2003)].
We apply the model to quarterly data from the early U.S. cellular telephone industry between
1984 and 1988. The FCC divided the continental US 302 into non–overlapping regional markets and
issued exactly two licenses for each market. The typical situation was that an incumbent (the
so–called wireline) started operation before a second operator (the nonwireline) entered. We thus
have a period of monopoly, followed by duopoly. We use this data to study the impact of competition
and price–cost margins and marginal costs. Our results indicate that the margins increase under
duopoly, due to a significant reduction in marginal costs. Moreover, we find that the price–cost
margins vary over the consumption levels and that low end users are subject to higher price–cost
margins than high–end users. The impact of competition further increases the margins in the
low–end user segment, relative to high end–users. In that sense the benefits of competition, which
are largely due to increased efficiencies, are passed on relatively more to high–end users. We also
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show that these findings are robust even if one includes a number of observable market demand and
cost variables.
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 describes the basic model, then Section 3 implements
it, and Section 4 concludes.
2 A Duopoly Model of Nonlinear Pricing Competition
This section is based largely on Miravete and Ro¨ller (2003). Let there be two firms denoted 1 and
2, each offering a service x1 and x2. We begin by specifying the demand side and assume that
consumers’ utility can be characterized by:
U(x1, x2, θ1, θ2, κ) = θ1x1 + θ2x2 − b12 x
2
1 −
b2
2
x22 + κx1x2, (1)
where all parameters except κ are positive, and where θ1 and θ2 denote type dimensions accounting
for the intensity of preferences of product varieties offered by firm 1 and 2, respectively. When κ < 0
the two services are substitutes, when κ = 0 they are independent, and when κ > 0 then the services
are offered by the two firms are complements. If θ1 = θ2 and b1 = b2 = −κ then x1 and x2 are
perfect substitutes [see Vives (1999)]. When x2 = 0, this expression defines the preferences under
the monopoly period.
The second element of demand specification in models of nonlinear pricing is the joint distri-
bution of consumer types over θ1 and θ2. The equilibrium distribution of the “effective” willingness
to pay for a particular service is now also affected by the pricing decision of the competing firm. The
equilibrium distribution of types will therefore be endogenously determined by the nonlinear tariffs
offered by the competing firms and. The sufficient statistic that captures consumers’ heterogeneity
of preferences for product 1 is:
z1 = θ1 +
κθ2
b2 + γ2
, (2)
so that when products are independent (i.e., κ = 0), competing firms become local monopolists and
types need not be redefined.
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In order to solve the model in closed–form we assume that z1 and z2 have a joint Sarmanov
distribution with the following Burr type XII marginals:
θi ∼ Fi(zi) = 1−
[
1− zi − zi
zi− zi
]1/λi
, zi ∈ [zi, zi]. (3)
For the monopoly case, we simply have a Burr type XII distribution for θ1, which includes,
among others, the uniform distribution as a special case. There are several advantages of using this
distribution. First, it allows for general correlation patterns among types. Second, this distribution
allows for explicit closed form solution for the pricing problem, for both the monopoly and the
duopoly cases. Third, different values of λi identify whether high valuation consumers are more
or less numerous than low valuation consumers. Thus, given the ratio of high to low valuation
customers, firms have to introduce more or less powerful contracts to induce self–selection and thus
minimize the informational rents kept by consumers. More or less powerful contracts translate into
tariff functions with different degree of concavity. Thus, the distributional assumption (3) allows
us to summarize in a single sufficient statistic the degree of concavity of the tariff over the relevant
consumption range. Lastly, the optimal markup is increasing on λi, and both the markup and the
hazard rate of the distribution of zi can be unequivocally ordered with respect to λi. The position
and curvature of the lower envelope of tariff options in the data is therefore the key element to
identify this parameter .
Given the preferences (1), the distributional assumption (3), and denoting marginal costs
by ci(Y,Wi) –i.e., depending on the overall scale of the market and a vector of input prices–, the
optimal tariff is a quadratic function of purchases where the coefficients are nonlinear functions of
the structural parameters c1, c2, λ1, λ2, κ, b1, b2, while the optimal consumption is linear in the type
of consumers.
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3 Empirical Implementation
The tariff data we observe is a menu of two–part tariffs for each firm in each market at a point in
time. To identify the structural parameters we first specify the following approximation to the menu
of two-part tariffs:1
Ti(xi) = αi + βixi +
γi
2
x2i . (4)
Given that we have information on the entire menu of two part tariffs, (4) can be estimated
by a series of simple OLS regressions as follows. Varying the usage of x1 and x2 from 1 to X (where X
is the maximum consumption level that we fix at 500 minutes given the usage pattern of this market
in the 1980s) we can compute the associated minimum tariff, by choosing the tariff that yields the
lowest payment for that usage level. Using this data, we can then estimate (4), yielding parameter
estimates {α1, α2, β1, β2, γ1, γ2}. Note that this estimation is done for each market at each point in
time. We thus obtain reduced from estimates on the shape of the tariff for all observations in our
data set.
3.1 Identification
Having obtained reduced form estimates that summarize the shape of the tariff {α1, α2, β1, β2, γ1, γ2}
we next ask what structural parameters can be identified from this information. In other words, our
approach does not estimate the structural parameters directly from the first–order conditions using
nonlinear techniques, but rather uses the information contained in the reduced form estimates and
asks what structural parameters can be solved for.
Overall, there are a total of nine structural parameters {c1, c2, λ1, λ2, z◦1 , zc2irc, b1, b2, κ} that
characterize the above equilibrium approach and that one needs to identify in order to do a complete
1 See Miravete and Ro¨ller (2003) for a discussion on using a continuous tariff approximation to a menu of
two–part tariffs. Basically, if firms offer a menu with a discrete number of options they will not extract the maximum
informational rents from consumers. Unless we account for some costs associated with the introduction of an increasing
number of tariff options, the equilibrium number of tariff options will never be finite. Indicators related to these billing
or marketing costs are not available, and thus, we are not able to modify the model to determine endogenously the
optimal number of optional two-part tariffs offered. The main justification for our approach is that the number of
options needed to “almost” mimic the continuous solution is quite small. See also Wilson (1993) and Miravete (2003).
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equilibrium analysis. These structural parameters characterize the distribution of consumer types
(λi), the marginal costs (ci), the marginal consumer (z◦i ), the degree of substitutability between
the two products (κ), as well as the slope of demands (bi). However, there are only 6 pieces of
information available from the shape of the tariff through {α1, α2, β1, β2, γ1, γ2}.
In general, there are three more pieces of information necessary to identify all the structural
parameters of the nonlinear pricing game. To see this, we equate the coefficients of the quadratic ap-
proximation to those of the tariff solution of the nonlinear pricing model to obtain: (the relationships
for firm 2 are again analogous),
c1 = β1 + γ1X, (5a)
λ1 =
−γ1
γ1 +
[
b1 − κ
2
b2 + γ2
] ≥ 0, (5b)
z◦1 = β1 +
κβ2
b2 + γ2
. (5c)
where z◦1 is derived from x1(z
◦
1) = 0, i.e., the consumption for the lowest type is zero, while X is
the maximum consumption. Observe that the identification of λ1 depends on the curvature of both
tariffs through γ1 and γ2. This ensures that the nonlinear tariffs are best response to each other, and
therefore we make use of the Nash perfection to identify the distributions of types. Identification
for the special case of monopoly is obtained by setting κ = 0.
As can be seen in (3), identification of the structural parameters {λ1, λ2, z◦1 , z◦2} requires
estimates of {b1, b2, κ}. Miravete and Ro¨ller (2003) obtain estimates of these demand parameters,
using a sub–sample of markets where information on the number of subscribers is available. Having
made additional identification assumptions to recover the distributional parameters {λ1, λ2, z◦1 , z◦2}
allows the full calculation of all welfare results, such as consumer surplus and profits integrated over
the entire range of consumer groups.
By contrast, the identification of marginal costs is relatively straightforward. Since c1 =
β1 + γ1X, marginal costs are identified by the slope and the curvature of the equilibrium tariff
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function, as well as by the maximum consumption. In other words, less is needed to recover marginal
costs in this equilibrium context, even though without {λ1, λ2, z◦1 , z◦2}, welfare magnitudes are not
identifiable.
Below we will concentrate on issues that can be addressed from estimation of marginal costs
alone. Moreover, note that identification of price–cost margins is also less demanding. Using the
fact that the derivative of the tariff is the price at each usage level, we can derive price–cost markups
as a function of consumption from (4) and (5a) as follows:
PCM(xi) =
pi(xi)− ci
pi(xi)
=
γi (X− xi)
βi + γixi
. (6)
where a similar expression holds for the other firm. Note that the PCM of each firm varies with
consumption, going towards zero as consumption approaches the maximum.
3.2 Estimates of Price-Cost Margins
We are now ready to investigate the price–cost margins and how they are affected by the introduction
of a second competitor. Using the estimates of the tariff functions (4), Table 1 reports the average
PCM for the monopoly and duopoly periods. Note that we have restricted ourselves to three
consumption levels, namely 50 minutes (low), 250 minutes (medium), and 450 minutes (high).
We have assumed that the maximum consumption is 500 minutes (ı.e. X = 500). This
choice of maximum consumption was made after studying aggregate statistics of cellular telephone
usage in the mid 1980s. Individual data on consumption is not available, and an airtime of 500
minutes is well above the average monthly usage of 200 minutes at this time.
As can be seen, the price–cost margins are declining in the usage levels, ranging from 13.6%
for low consumption, over 9.3% for medium, to 2.4% for high consumption in the monopoly period.
This implies that the markups vary considerably across users. Interestingly, the price–cost margins
under duopoly vary even more and are generally, ranging from 19.6%, over 13.1% to 3.4% for the
respective consumption levels. At first glance it thus appears that competition leads to higher
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price–cost margins across consumption levels. Before interpreting this finding further, it should be
noted that the comparisons in Table 1 are not controlled for other exogenous demand and cost
factors, which may have varied across markets and may explain markups.
Table 1 also reports the estimated marginal costs, which is found to be on average 63 cents
under monopoly and 58 cents under duopoly. In other words, marginal costs drop significantly due
to the introduction of competition. On the other hand, prices are much less affected by entry (see
Table 1 again), even though they are lower under duopoly. For example, at low usage levels prices
are essentially the same, while at the very high end of consumption marginal rates drop from 64
cents per minute to 60 cents per minute. Overall, it appears that price–cost margins increase under
duopoly because marginal costs have come down considerably more than prices.2
3.3 Relating Price–Cost Margins to Market Characteristics
To further control for exogenous changes, we report OLS estimates, where we regress the estimated
price–cost margins on observable demand and cost characteristics. Table 2 provides summary
statistics and defines the variables used in the analysis. Essentially, we have three types of exogenous
variables that are used in the regressions below. First, there are demand side variables such as
number of business, age of the market, population, average commuting time in the market, and
growth of the population. Second, we have cost variables such as cost of energy, prime lending rate,
wage index in the telecommunications sector, average rent of a square foot of office space, and an
index of operating cost of offices. In addition, the variables duo is an indicator of entry, and trend
is controlling for changes over time.
Table 3 presents the estimation results of markups on these observed market characteristics
at three usage levels (50, 250, and 450 minutes of consumption, respectively). As can be seen, the
2 Since other factors might be driving the development of price-cost margins (such as demand and cost
conditions), we have also checked the change in price–cost margins and marginal costs at the actual time of entry.
More precisely, we consider the last quarter where a particular market is a monopoly and compare this to the first
quarter of duopoly. In other words, we compare two subsequent quarters, where the event of entry has occurred in the
second quarter. The results are such that prices are hardly affected by entry, while marginal costs drop significantly
from $0.617 to $0.576.
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impact on competition is to increase the price–cost margins. In particular, the coefficient on duo
indicates that the price–cost margins for the low end users (50 minutes of consumption) increased by
3.9%. Moreover, this is statistically significant (t–stat of 2.35). For the medium and high–end users,
we also find that price–cost margins increase significantly, although the increase is smaller than for
the low end customers. Specifically, medium users yield a 2.5% increase in margins, while high end
users are subject to only 0.6% increase in margins. In this sense, competition increase margins more
for low end users than for high end users.
It should be noted that the results in Table 3 are broadly in line with the descriptive findings
in Table 1, although the impact of competition on all margins is lower, once we have controlled for
other observable market characteristics.
The estimates in Table 3 further imply a negative and statistically very significant time
trend on margins across all usage levels. For example, the price–cost margin for low end users
falls on average 3.9% per quarter. This is almost as much as in the quarter when entry occurred,
suggesting that the reduction in margins is roughly doubled when entry occurs.
Regarding the exogenous demand variables we find that many demand side variables are sig-
nificantly related to margins (see Table 3). For example, more high potential business establishments
(business) and population growth (growth) both raise margins significantly across all users, while
an increase in the time of commuting lowers margins. Interestingly, the age of the market further
increase margins, indicating that mature markets charge higher markups (even though there is a
general downward trend on markups).
In terms of the exogenous cost variables, we find that these variables are generally associated
with lower margins, which is line with intuition (except for wages). Furthermore, Table 3 also reports
on the marginal cost estimates. As can be seen, competition has a significant impact on marginal
costs. Specifically, marginal costs are reduced by 4 cents, which is roughly in line with the descriptive
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results obtained in Table 1. Moreover, there is no statistically significant time trend, indicating that
this is a one–time sustainable reduction in marginal costs that occurs at the time of entry.
Overall, the results in Table 3, which are controlled for a number of observable demand and
cost factors, are very consistent with the more descriptive results of Table 1. In sum, our results
indicate that the margins are increased under duopoly, due to a significant reduction in marginal
costs. Moreover, we find that the price–cost margins vary over the consumption levels and that low
end users are subject to higher price–cost margins than high end users. The impact of competition
further increases the margins in the low end user segment, relative to high end users. In that sense
the benefits of competition, which are largely due to increased efficiencies, are passed on relatively
more to high end users.
4 Conclusion
This paper introduces a structural model of competition, where firms compete in nonlinear prices. In
general, nonlinear pricing introduces new issues that are absent in models of uniform pricing. When
a firm offers a menu of two–part tariffs, consumers selfs-select the tariff that is optimal for them.
Designing the menu of tariffs according to the distribution of consumers introduces the possibility
for a firm to price–discriminate amongst consumer groups. As a result the price–cost margins vary
across consumer groups.
To evaluate such price–cost margins, we identify marginal cost from an equilibrium model
of competition. In this paper we have concentrated on identifying marginal costs, even though there
are other structural parameters of importance, such as the distribution of consumer types, which
would allow the evaluation of consumer surplus or welfare (see Miravete and Ro¨ller, 2003).
We apply the model to quarterly data from the early U.S. cellular telephone industry between
1984 and 1988. Our results indicate that the margins are increased under duopoly, due to a significant
reduction in marginal costs. Moreover, we find that the price–cost margins vary over the consumption
– 10 –
levels and that low end users are subject to higher price-cost margins than high-end users. The
impact of competition further increases the margins in the low-end user segment, relative to high
end-users. In that sense the benefits of competition, which are largely due to increased efficiencies,
are passed on relatively more to high end users.
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Table 1 
Markups, Prices, Tariffs and Marginal Costs 
 
 
minutes 50 250 450 
(p-c)/p 0.136 0.093 0.024 
P(x) 0.748 0.695 0.642 
T(x) 46.17 123.93 196.29 
Monopoly Markets 
c 0.629 0.629 0.629 
(p-c)/p 0.196 0.131 0.034 
P(x) 0.748 0.675 0.602 
T(x) 38.34 115.29 184.41 
Duopoly Markets 
c 0.584 0.584 0.584 
All money-valued magnitudes are in dollars. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Market Characteristics 
 
 
There are 730 observations. Variables are defined as follows (see Miravete 
and Röller (2003) for details): market = market identifier, year = 
year/month of observation, duo = dummy indicating duopoly markets, trend 
= a time trend in month, business = number of high potential business 
establishments (in thousands), age = age of the market in months, pop = 
population of SMSA in millions, commute = average commuting time in 
minutes, growth = average % growth of population, in the 1980’s, energy = 
state average electricity prices in dollars per kilwatt/hour (in logs), prime = 
one-year lagged prime lending rate (reflecting the costs of financing cellular 
equipment), wage = index of average annual wages per employee in the 
cellular industry (in logs), rent = index of average monthly rent per square 
foot (in logs), and operate = index of operating expenses (in logs). 
 
 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
MARKET 
YEAR 
DUO 
TREND 
BUSINESS 
AGE 
POP 
COMMUTE 
GROWTH 
ENERGY 
PRIME 
WAGE 
RENT 
OPERATE 
38.378 
868.205 
0.344 
9.778 
48.924 
19.666 
2.288 
26.238 
1.164 
0.509 
9.474 
1.938 
2.758 
1.849 
1.000 
844.000 
0.000 
1.000 
7.489 
1.000 
0.336 
20.900 
-0.600 
-0.362 
7.750 
1.344 
2.013 
0.989 
99.000 
883.000 
1.000 
16.000 
394.436 
46.000 
14.990 
36.500 
3.599 
1.046 
11.000 
2.711 
3.589 
2.608 
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